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PLAYING A MAN DOWN: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS 
AND STADIUM FINANCE—HOW LEAGUES AND 
FRANCHISES EXTRACT FAVORABLE TERMS 
FROM AMERICAN CITIES 
Abstract: In an era of unprecedented profitability, expansion, and popularity of 
American professional sports leagues, it seems outrageous that cities and munici-
palities across the United States would continue to subsidize the funding of new 
stadiums for wealthy sports franchises. Yet despite the economic obstacles facing 
many of these cities and municipalities, the gratuitous public funding of stadiums 
across the United States persists. This reality stems from the extraordinary bar-
gaining power that professional sports franchises maintain over the cities in 
which they are located. Indeed, threating to relocate a franchise brings forth a lit-
any of cities that are ready and willing to offer favorable terms to fund a new sta-
dium. Legislative efforts to restrict stadium finance have paradoxically forced 
municipalities into even less favorable stadium deals that relied on public tax 
dollars while other efforts to reform stadium financing have failed to gain trac-
tion among municipal governments and federal lawmakers. This Note evaluates 
the various methods of stadium financing by discussing the private and public 
sources of funding. This Note goes on to evaluate the application of the public 
purpose doctrine in restricting the issuance of public finance. Finally, this Note 
explores potential solutions to the challenges that face municipalities when it 
comes to stadium financing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Professional sports occupy a unique place in American culture, constitut-
ing one of the bedrocks of American civic identity.1 It should come as no sur-
prise, then, that when sports franchises relocate, it feels as if their host cities 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Christine Emba, Why Do We Care About Sports So Much?, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/03/14/why-do-we-care-about-sports-so-
much/?utm_term=.dbeb70198e44 [https://perma.cc/6TVG-UZWF] (discussing why Americans be-
come so invested in sports); Michael Shackelford, The Importance of Sports in America, BLEACHER 
REP. (July 4, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/211946-the-importance-of-sports-in-america# 
[https://perma.cc/64BT-LE6R] (discussing why sports play such a large role in American culture). 
The history of sports in America is intertwined with some of the most significant moments in Ameri-
can history. See Shackelford, supra. For example, during the Civil War, Confederate and Union sol-
diers played baseball when they were not busy fighting. Id. Another example is the legendary baseball 
player Jackie Robinson, who captured the nation’s attention when he broke the color barrier in profes-
sional baseball at the outset of the Civil Rights era in the United States. Id. 
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lose a portion of their civic identity.2 Today, it seems like a new franchise 
threatens to leave and rip the heart out of its loyal fans more frequently than 
ever.3 When this occurs, it is often the taxpayers who are left out to dry, as they 
are bereft of their sports franchise and often stuck with the stadium bill.4 
Despite the perils of franchise relocation, and the tremendous investment 
in both physical and emotional capital required to support a team in the Na-
tional Football League (“NFL”), National Basketball Association (“NBA”), 
Major League Baseball (“MLB”), or National Hockey League (“NHL”), sports 
fans and cities alike crave the benefits that a professional franchise can bring.5 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See JOANNA CAGAN & NEIL DEMAUSE, FIELD OF SCHEMES: HOW THE GREAT STADIUM SWIN-
DLE TURNS PUBLIC MONEY INTO PRIVATE PROFIT 1–4 (2002) (describing how the National Football 
League’s (“NFL”) Ravens franchise abandoned Baltimore for more lucrative grounds in Indianapolis); 
David Uberti, How American Sports Franchises Are Selling Their Cities Short, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 
22, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/sep/22/-sp-how-american-sports-franchises-sell-
cities-short [https://perma.cc/2CRT-CEYZ] (arguing that franchises sometimes fail to consider the 
impact they have on their host cities). Thousands of citizens fought to prevent the SuperSonics of the 
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) from leaving Seattle for Oklahoma City by challenging the 
move in court and fighting for a seat at the city’s negotiating table. Elizabeth Odian, Preventing Son-
icsgate: The Ongoing Problem of Franchise Relocation, 18 SPORTS LAW. J. 67, 68 (2011). 
 3 See Adam Hanau, Note, NFL Team Relocations in the Age of Modern Stadium Finance: Moti-
vations for a Team to Move and Implications for Smaller Markets, 13 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 235, 237 
(2016) (discussing the economic and social impact of franchise relocation). Hanau suggests that, as 
opposed to the 1980s and 1990s, teams primarily relocate today for greater access to television mar-
kets or for increased cash-flow/valuation, usually in the form of increased opportunity for sports 
community development, personal seat licenses (“PSL”), and stadium sponsorships. Id. Although 
Hanau notes that television markets are attractive to NFL franchises, he emphasizes that television 
revenue is shared amongst the league’s teams, thereby minimizing the television market as a factor. 
Id. at 265–66. On the other hand, citing the planned Inglewood, California, stadium built to house the 
Rams and the Chargers, Hanau notes that “master planned sports and entertainment communities”—
so-called sportscomms—offer huge opportunities for cash-flow growth to defray the expenses of 
stadium construction. Id. at 245–46. 
 4 See Martin Greenberg, Sports Facility Financing and Development Trends in the United States, 
15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 93, 112 (2004) (suggesting that the high cost of stadium construction, and 
the tax-exemptions provided for such construction, means that when franchises break their leases, 
while, perhaps, economically efficient, it creates high public exposure to financial losses). The rela-
tionship between landlord (city) and tenant (franchise) in stadium leases is not a simple landlord-
tenant relationship; the impact on the community is much greater than that of a typical commercial 
lease. Id. 
 5 See Andrew H. Goodman, The Public Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums: Policy and 
Practice, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 174 (2002) (discussing how taxpayers subsidize stadium construction 
for the various leagues); see also, e.g., Poe v. Hillsborough County, 695 So. 2d 672, 678–79 (Fla. 
1997) (finding that the Tampa Bay Buccaneers instilled civic pride into the community and that the 
games and other stadium events furthered a public purpose by enhancing the community image and 
providing entertainment and cultural activities for residents). Some scholars even suggest that fans 
bind up their own identities with “their” team. Debra Laverie & Dennis Arnett, Factors Affecting 
Attendance: The Influence of Identity Salience and Satisfaction, 32 J. LEISURE RES. 225, 227, 230 
(2000). When sports are the chosen leisure activity, fans experience increases in both social and emo-
tional identity, leading to the creation of a common fan identity that transcends other societal limita-
tions. Id. This identity also has a way of manifesting itself externally through public identification 
with a team or franchise. Id. 
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The costs associated with developing a stadium attractive enough to lure a 
franchise, however, are tremendously high; for example, the public contribu-
tion to U.S. Bank Stadium, the new home to the NFL’s Minnesota Vikings, will 
total nearly $500 million.6 The stadium construction costs are not the end of 
the story, however, as there are the additional costs of developing the surround-
ing infrastructure as well as social costs imposed on surrounding communi-
ties.7 Moreover, the cost of a new stadium increases each year due to the stadi-
um “arms race” taking place among franchises.8 
There are additional challenges inherent in the development of any pro-
ject requiring the land and resources of a stadium.9 Eminent domain and the 
takings power issues are particularly thorny when, arguably, the primary bene-
fits of sports stadia flow to the private team and owner.10 These same concerns 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Rochelle Olson, New Vikings Stadium, 90 Percent Done, Is ‘Right on Track,’, STAR TRIB. 
(Minnesota) (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/vikings-stadium-authority-and-its-general-
contractor-close-to-settlement/368978151/ [https://perma.cc/KVJ3-AKNY]. 
 7 Jason Notte, Opinion: This Kind of Stadium Funding Could Only Happen in Las Vegas, MKT. 
WATCH (May 14, 2016, 7:14 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-kind-of-stadium-funding-
could-only-happen-in-las-vegas-2016-05-13 [https://perma.cc/5BAK-AC4U]. For example, the new 
stadium proposal of the NFL’s Oakland Raiders funds the project through $300 million in private 
finance, $200 million in an NFL-backed loan, and $750 million in public finance. Id. 
 8 Mildred Robinson, Public Finance of Sports Stadia: Controversial but Permissible . . . Time for 
Federal Income Tax Relief for State and Local Taxpayers, 1 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 145–46 
(2002). This is true even if one indexes for inflation. Id. at 156.; United States Inflation Rate, TRAD-
ING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/inflation-cpi [https://perma.cc/3G5V-RH3S] 
(providing historical rates of inflation). State-of-the-art facilities quickly become outdated, as the 
norm for stadium construction is constantly re-defined. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 104. One com-
mentator has described the trend in stadium construction as a “sports version of the arms race,” as 
each new stadium is more elaborate and more profitable. Id. This reflects, in part, a trend in stadium 
design toward more fan-friendly and consumer-oriented entertainment experiences. Id. The costs of 
stadium construction, however, are driven up by the trend toward the urban development of stadiums 
as well. Tim Chapin, The Political Economy of Sports Facility Location: An End-of-the-Century Re-
view and Assessment, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 361, 382 (2000); Robinson, supra. This is true despite 
the fact that urban locations are superficially unattractive due to the aforementioned higher costs and 
increased distance from the primarily affluent fan-base. Chapin, supra, at 363–64. 
 9 Michael Birch, Take Some Land for the Ball Game: Sports Stadiums, Eminent Domain, and the 
Public Use Debate, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 174 (2012); see infra notes 10–11 and accompanying text 
(discussing eminent domain issues in stadium finance). 
 10 Birch, supra note 9, at 174 (2012). The Takings Clause establishes that “private property [shall 
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amend-
ment provides an implicit acknowledgement of the government’s power to take private property for a 
public use, also known as the power of eminent domain. Id. The Fourteenth Amendment extended the 
availability of the Takings Clause to the State. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 232 (1897) (finding that the city of Chicago could use takings power). The 
requirements of just compensation and public purpose serve as the two primary limitations on the use 
of eminent domain. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In the wake of the 2005 Supreme Court case Kelo v. City 
of New London, many state and municipal bodies have turned to eminent domain power to acquire the 
necessary land, resulting in a number of suits challenging the public use. See, e.g., 545 U.S. 469 
(2005); Goldstein v. Pataki (Goldstein II), 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding re-development project, 
despite private benefit, to be public use); Goldstein v. Pataki (Goldstein I), 488 F. Supp. 2d 254 
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emerge when considering whether the state should aid in the financing of sta-
dium construction projects when the financial benefits flow primarily to 
wealthy players and owners while the costs are borne by the average citizen 
who may never see the inside of the stadium.11 Furthermore, any federal ef-
forts to address the inherent challenges of financing a new stadium face com-
peting interests.12 On the one hand, courts and federal statutes are generally 
deferential to state and local government policy, particularly where it concerns 
taxation or specific projects such as stadium construction.13 On the other hand, 
states and municipalities routinely cut deals that appear less than desirable to 
the local taxpayers and the federal government has previously implemented tax 
changes that have had dramatic impacts on how states and municipalities 
spend and raise money.14 Further, in just this past year, the federal tax benefits 
awarded to national sports leagues have come under renewed scrutiny by Pres-
ident Trump and the Republican controlled Congress.15 
This Note provides an overview of the most common costs associated 
with financing a stadium and the methods of financing available.16 Part I of 
this Note discusses the various methods of private financing available in the 
construction of stadiums and provides a brief overview of their advantages and 
disadvantages.17 Part II discusses the mechanics of how municipalities help 
                                                                                                                           
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding condemnation did not violate public use requirement); Cascott, L.L.C. v. 
City of Arlington, 278 S.W. 3d 523 (Tex. App. 2009) (finding that lease terms did not violate the state 
constitution because they did not serve a purely private purpose). Even so, courts have been deferen-
tial to states and municipalities in their determination of public use. Birch, supra note 9, at 185–86. 
 11 Robinson, supra note 8, at 155–56. The construction and tax benefits provided to sports stadi-
ums are similar to the business and tax subsidies provided to corporate entities. Hanau, supra note 3, 
at 242. Corporations frequently leverage their financial and economic contributions against localities 
to extract favorable tax terms or local subsidies. Peter Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: 
Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 394–95 
(1996). Corporate relocation, however, also depends on other factors such as market wages, communi-
ty education levels, the existence of similar businesses in the community, and the regulatory climate, 
thereby reducing the importance of local subsidies in relocation decisions. Id. at 391. 
 12 Enrich, supra note 11, at 381–82; Robinson, supra note 8, at 139–40. 
 13 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (barring federal court jurisdiction of cases seeking to enjoin 
or restrain the assessment, levy, or collection of state taxes where a remedy may be had in the state 
courts); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (noting that 
states serve as laboratories of democracy and that they should have freedom to experiment with their 
public policy). 
 14 Robinson, supra note 8, at 166 n.135 (citing as example the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 
1981’s “‘loophole’ closure and extensive changes in rate structures” for individuals and corporations). 
 15 Steve Contorno, How the Federal Tax Bill Could Make It More Expensive to Build the Rays a 
New Ballpark, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.tampabay.com/news/How-the-federal-
tax-bill-could-make-it-more-expensive-to-build-the-Rays-a-new-ballpark_163409005 [https://perma.
cc/DJW6-36LV]; Ben Nuckols, GOP Tax Bill Would Have Impact on Pro, College Sports, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 7, 2017), http://stats.washingtonpost.com/fb/story.asp?i=20171107143230284621808
&ref=hea&tm=&src= [https://perma.cc/9HDR-YBML]. 
 16 See infra notes 22–217 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 22–73 and accompanying text. 
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finance stadium construction projects.18 Finally, Part III evaluates the various 
methods of combatting or addressing issues with the public financing of stadi-
um construction.19 Part III also evaluates the proposed solutions to the public 
subsidization of stadiums and considers various leasing methods for protecting 
the taxpayer from “franchise free agency” and insulating municipalities from 
the infrastructure and construction cost overruns that are frequently associated 
with their construction.20 Further, the Note considers what role the federal tax 
policy ought to play in promoting or discouraging certain methods of fi-
nance.21 
I. PRIVATE FUNDING 
The owners of professional sports franchises are the most immediate 
source of funding for the construction of professional stadiums.22 For example, 
the constructions of Levi’s Stadium in Santa Clara, California, MetLife Stadi-
um in the Meadowlands, New Jersey, and the Los Angeles stadium at Holly-
wood Park, currently under construction, have all relied extensively on private, 
owner-backed, financing.23 This Part provides an overview of the most com-
mon methods of private financing.24 Owner backed financing, however, is by 
no means the rule.25 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 74–217 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 218–275 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 228–252 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 253–275 and accompanying text. 
 22 Goodman, supra note 5, at 188. 
 23 See NFL Stadium Funding Information: Stadiums Opened Since 1997, CONVENTIONS SPORTS 
& LEISURE, https://cbsminnesota.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/nfl-funding-summary-12-2-11.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3XX3-9APQ] [hereinafter NFL Stadium Funding Information] (providing funding 
information on NFL stadiums); Jim Trotter & Eric D. Williams, Chargers Chairman ‘Looking For-
ward’ After Announcing L.A. Move, ESPN (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/
18458293/chargers-announce-move-los-angeles-leaving-san-diego [https://perma.cc/26MP-SBMD] 
(discussing Chargers move to Los Angeles). The average construction cost of NFL stadiums con-
structed since 1997 is nearly six hundred million dollars and, apart from MetLife Stadium, all have 
employed some form of public financing. Martin Greenberg & Michael Gavin, NFL G-3 and G-4 
Credit Facility Has Made Possible New State-of- the-Art Stadiums, GREENBERG L. OFF. (Apr. 1, 
2016), http://www.greenberglawoffice.com/nfl-credit- facility-has- made-possible- new-state-of- the-
art- stadiums/#_ednref7 [https://perma.cc/2X5A-3HP3]; NFL Stadium Funding Information, supra. 
 24 See infra notes 30–73 and accompanying text. 
 25 NFL Stadium Funding Information, supra note 23; see infra notes 74–217 and accompanying 
text. Further, at least one of the professional sports leagues has demonstrated a willingness to assist in 
defraying the financing costs of stadium construction. Benjamin Bolas, Who Is Going to Pay the Bills: 
An Examination of the Financing and Lease Options Available to the Buffalo Bills and Ralph Wilson 
Stadium, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 663, 684 (2013). The NFL G-3 and G-4 loan programs 
serve as an example to the other professional sports leagues of one way in which the leagues them-
selves can contribute to the stadium construction costs. Id. 
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Section A this Part provides an overview of the most common types of 
franchise owner or private financing.26 Section B briefly discusses the contri-
butions of naming rights to financing stadium projects.27 Section C discusses 
the recent impact of personal seat licenses and luxury suites.28 Finally, Section 
D discusses the emerging method of stadium financing through the develop-
ment of comprehensive sports communities.29 
A. Owner and Developer Financing 
The owner of the NFL’s Los Angeles Rams, Stan Kroenke, will borrow 
nearly one billion dollars, in addition to his own cash contribution, to fund the 
construction of the most expensive, privately-financed sports complex in histo-
ry.30 The total cost of the complex is estimated to be nearly $2.7 billion.31 The 
economic conditions of the past decade have contributed greatly to a rise in 
owner contributions toward stadium financing.32 Accordingly, most owners of 
professional franchises possess the ability to fund at least a portion of the cost 
of a professional stadium, particularly when they stand to be one of the prima-
ry beneficiaries of the construction project.33 Indeed, in recent years, with pub-
                                                                                                                           
 26 See infra notes 30–45 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 51–59 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 60–73 and accompanying text. 
 30 Elyse Glickman, Kroenke to Borrow $1 Billion for Inglewood Stadium, L.A. BUS. J. (Jan. 18, 
2016), http://labusinessjournal.com/news/2016/jan/18/kroenke-borrow-1-billion-inglewood-stadium/ 
[https://perma.cc/6CR2-NYBU]. 
 31 Id.; Brian Libby, The Rams’ Inglewood Stadium Could Be a Game Changer in Planning, AR-
CHITECT MAG. (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.architectmagazine.com/practice/the-rams-inglewood-
stadium-could-be-a-game-changer-in-planning_o [https://web.archive.org/web/20170115100649/
http://www.architectmagazine.com/practice/the-rams-inglewood-stadium-could-be-a-game-changer-
in-planning_o]. Not everyone is a winner in this deal, as the city of St. Louis, Missouri will continue 
to pay nearly six million dollars per year to pay off the stadium where the Rams had played for the 
previous two decades. Kelsey E. Thomas, What the L.A. Rams Deal Says About Cities Building Stadi-
ums, NEXT CITY (Jan. 14, 2016), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/la-rams-new-stadium-funding-nfl. 
 32 Martin J. Greenberg & Dennis Hughes, Jr., Sports.comm: It Takes a Village to Build a Sports 
Facility, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 91, 92 (2011). This shift can be attributed to 1) lack of political 
support; 2) decreased public support for funding state-of-the-art facilities; 3) limited state governmen-
tal capacity to finance such infrastructure projects; 4) forced state government spending prioritization; 
and 5) decreased desirability of using tax-exempt municipal bonds as finance tools. Id. 
 33 See Eben Novy-Williams, NFL Teams Split $7.3 Billion in Revenue, Packers Numbers Reveal, 
BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2015, 4:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-20/nfl-
teams-split-7-3-billion-in-revenue-packers-numbers-reveal [https://perma.cc/8TWP-8JNF] (discussing 
the revenue shared by NFL teams and their owners). The average owner of an NBA franchise has a 
net worth of nearly $3.5 billion while the average net worth of owners of NFL, National Hockey 
League (“NHL”), and Major League Baseball (“MLB”) franchises stands at $3.0 billion, $2.5 billion, 
and $2.0 billion respectively. Id. Moreover, in 2015, each NFL franchise received $226.4 million from 
league revenue sharing that did not even include additional revenue earned by individual franchises 
from sale of merchandise or tickets. Id. 
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lic funding growing scarcer and more politically risky, a number of franchise-
owners have borne a higher portion of stadium construction costs.34 
Owner financing refers broadly to investment by team owners in the con-
struction of the stadium.35 The main benefit of owner financing, for both cities 
and their citizens, is the ability of franchise-funded stadiums to serve as an an-
chor, preventing cities from falling victim to “franchise free agency” by en-
hancing the owner’s stake in the success of the development project.36 “Fran-
chise free agency” is the colloquial term for the manner in which cities com-
pete for the rights to host a professional franchise that often comes in the form 
of lucrative tax breaks or the promise of public funding for stadium construc-
tion.37 By contrast, although the city bears the sole cost of stadium develop-
ment, the individual leagues maintain bargaining power by restricting the po-
tential number of teams that could serve as stadium occupants.38 
Although the increase in ownership financing has decreased the need for 
public funding in some ways, the corresponding rise of stadium construction 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See, e.g., Tim Tucker, Falcons Secure $850M in Stadium Financing, ATLANTA J.-CONST. 
(Aug. 29th, 2016), http://www.ajc.com/sports/football/falcons-secure-850m-stadium-financing/
1hh8Aj1ni6jnAC6I2ZiluL/ [https://perma.cc/3NN6-STHM] (noting that only $200 million of the $1.5 
billion came from public sources). Private financing of the most recently constructed stadiums, Levi’s 
Stadium in San Francisco, California, MetLife Stadium in the Meadowlands, New Jersey, and AT&T 
Stadium in Arlington, Texas, accounted for 88%, 100% and 68% of the total stadium costs, respec-
tively. NFL Stadium Funding Information, supra note 23. By contrast, the new stadium of the NFL’s 
Minnesota Vikings, which opened in 2016, had nearly one-third of the stadium construction cost 
borne by the municipality. Brian Johnson, Minnesota Vikings Stadium Cost Grows Again, FIN. & 
COM. (Apr. 15, 2016, 2:58 PM), http://finance-commerce.com/2016/04/minnesota-vikings-stadium-
cost-grows-again/ [https://perma.cc/A9MD-LMW7]. Accordingly, the municipal governments are 
responsible for approximately $498 million of the cost of construction for the Vikings’ new stadium. 
Id. 
 35 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 31 (discussing how owners can pay for the construction of a 
stadium). 
 36 Katherine Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National Football 
League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 478–79 (1997). 
 37 Id. at 478. Other than the practical limitations of franchise relocation, most of the major sports 
leagues restrict the ability of individual franchises to move. Greenberg, supra note 4, at 117–18. Alt-
hough most leagues require the approval of at least 75% of the league owners before a franchise may 
relocate, total restraints on relocation have been found to be violations of anti-trust law. Id. See gener-
ally Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that 
NBA league rules on relocation violated anti-trust law); L.A. Mem’l Coliseum v. Nat’l Football 
League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding three-quarter owner approval requirement to be an 
anti-trust violation). In Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum v. National Football League, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the NFL was not a single entity for the purposes of anti-trust law, reasoning that, 
although the teams agreed to common sets of rules and policies, they functioned as separate teams 
acting jointly for a competitive purpose. 726 F.2d at 1388. 
 38 See Nathaniel Grow, Regulating Professional Sports Leagues, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 573, 
645 (2015) (discussing how leagues deliberately undersupply the market for franchises). 
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costs has outpaced the benefits associated with ownership financing.39 Even 
where owners directly finance the construction of the stadium, there are addi-
tional costs that are not borne by the owner, such as the costs to develop the 
surrounding infrastructure to handle the increase in traffic, costs of utility 
work, and costs of additional services required by the stadium.40 
Finally, owner financing provides an alternate benefit by encouraging 
owners to approach the stadium and development in the surrounding commu-
nity as a long-term investment.41 This type of investment can provide spill-
over benefits to the community—such as increased foot traffic or increased 
game day revenue for surrounding businesses—and may encourage further 
development through public-private partnerships, or public agency invest-
ment.42 
There are some more recent examples of financing coming from private 
sources other than the team owners.43 The recently opened T-Mobile Arena in 
Las Vegas, Nevada was financed, at a cost of approximately $375 million, by a 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See NFL Stadium Funding Information, supra note 23. Although the Dallas Cowboys organiza-
tion and its owner, Jerry Jones, financed 63% of the costs of constructing AT&T Stadium, the remain-
ing 37%, or $444 million, was publicly financed. Id. 
 40 Thomas, supra note 31. The costs of the future home of the NFL’s Los Angeles Rams and Los 
Angeles Chargers will add up to nearly $60 million for utility and roadwork to be reimbursed by the 
city, as well as another $8 million per year for medical services, security, and shuttles for parking 
during events. Id. 
 41 Hanau, supra note 3, at 245–46. Stan Kroenke, the owner of the NFL’s Los Angeles Rams, 
described the team as “long-term investors.” Sam Farmer & Nathan Fenno, Q&A: Stan Kroenke Dis-
cusses His Picture-Perfect Vision for the L.A. Rams, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2016, 8:22 PM), http://
www.latimes.com/sports/nfl/la-sp-nfl-la-kroenke-20160114-story.html [https://perma.cc/4JHR-
RHG9]. This reflects the reality that the costs of the project necessitate a lengthy recovery period, but 
also that the stadium was part of a larger development project that may take many years to be fully 
realized. See Hanau, supra note 3, at 245–46. Similarly, the owner of the NHL’s Tampa Bay Light-
ning, Jeff Vinik, took a long-term, broad business approach to franchise stadium investment. Justine 
Griffin, Vinik’s Downtown Tampa Development Aims for Healthy Certification, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(Sept. 9, 2016), http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/realestate/surrounded-by-bloomin-onions-
and-checker-burgers-can-tampas-new/2292947 [https://perma.cc/5U8Z-6U62]. Vinik’s two-billion-
dollar development plan now provides a blueprint for the development of the Channelside district in 
downtown Tampa Bay, Florida. Id. 
 42 See, e.g., Richard Danielson, Port Tampa Bay Unveils $1.7 Billion Plan to Develop 45 Acres in 
Channel District, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Aug. 14, 2015, 12:54 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/
business/realestate/port-tampa-bay-to-unveil-vision-for-land-in-channel-district/2241164 [https://
perma.cc/YPW6-AEAY] (discussing how Vinik plans to invest in the surrounding community). Fol-
lowing Vinik’s proposed development of the neighboring Channelside District, the Tampa Port Au-
thority released their own development plan calling for a redevelopment of the cruise terminal, con-
struction of additional housing and parks, and a total investment of over $1.7 billion. Id. Even when 
these projects are privately funded, however, they require significant municipal infrastructure invest-
ment. Id. 
 43 See Jennifer Robison, Arena Opening Heightens Competition Among Existing Facilities, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J. (Apr. 5, 2016, 4:13 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/the-strip/t-mobile-arena/
arena-opening-heightens-competition-among-existing-facilities [https://perma.cc/9NSY-ZJLV] (dis-
cussing how the new arena raises the bar for new stadiums). 
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partnership between MGM Resorts International and Anschutz Entertainment 
Group.44 Though Las Vegas has attracted an NHL team since the completion of 
the arena, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the Las Vegas partnership 
because investors plan to recover most of their investment through tourist rev-
enues.45 
B. Naming Rights 
Sports Authority Field, the Barclays Center, Levi’s Stadium, and Amalie 
Arena are all stadiums that had costs born in part by the sale of stadium nam-
ing rights.46 A vast majority of stadiums in use by the United States’ profes-
sional sports leagues license their naming rights to corporations.47 Naming 
rights provide constant exposure across multiple media platforms, not to men-
tion the additional corporate benefit of having an urban centerpiece project 
marketing the corporate logo while serving as the colloquial Mecca of loyal 
sports fans.48 Companies who are willing to pay for naming rights, such as Le-
vi’s or Mercedes-Benz, can expect to spend an average of $8 million to $12 
million per year for over a decade or more.49 For successful, high profile 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. 
 45 Id.; Mike Coppinger, Las Vegas NHL Expansion Team Will Be Named the ‘Golden Knights,’ 
USA TODAY (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nhl/2016/11/22/las-vegas-nhl-
expansion-team-name-golden-knights/94308010/ [https://perma.cc/EBR9-7MZV]. 
 46 Alicia Jessop, Levi’s Gains Value Beyond Naming Rights in Its Partnership with the San Fran-
cisco 49ers, FORBES (Oct. 19, 2014, 6:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2014/
10/19/levis-gains-value-beyond-naming-rights-in-its-partnership-with-the-san-francisco-49ers/#
59897ec656db [https://perma.cc/EX2T-CW9B]; Tim Marcin, Atlanta Falcons New Stadium: Mer-
cedes-Benz Buys Naming Rights to $1.5B Venue, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2015, 11:51 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/atlanta-falcons-new-stadium-mercedes-benz-buys-naming-rights-15b-venue-
2063554 [https://web.archive.org/web/20170205123738/http://www.ibtimes.com/atlanta-falcons-new-
stadium-mercedes-benz-buys-naming-rights-15b-venue-2063554]; Alicia Wallace, Mile High Stadium 
Naming Rights Headed to the Denver Broncos, DENVER POST (Aug. 3, 2016, 9:28 AM), http://www.
denverpost.com/2016/08/03/mile-high-stadium-naming-rights-headed-denver-broncos/ [https://perma.
cc/ME2W-3BH7]. Even though Sports Authority eventually went bankrupt, the Denver Broncos pur-
chased and assumed the contract obligation intrinsic to the naming rights contract for Mile High Sta-
dium. Wallace, supra. 
 47 See, e.g., Brian Finkel, NFL Stadiums with the Most-Expensive Naming Rights, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 23, 2011, 2:55 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/photo-essays/2011-08-23/nfl-stadiums-
with-the-most-expensive-naming-rights [https://perma.cc/GXL6-7JDH] (listing the owners of naming 
rights for various NFL stadiums). 
 48 See Jessop, supra note 46 (discussing how Levi’s marketized their naming rights). For exam-
ple, Levi’s gained the ability to market through any representative of the San Francisco 49ers. Id. 
Furthermore, the cache of the naming rights spills over into other aspects of Levi’s market, allowing 
them to launch products catered to their sponsorship and marketing potential in the team’s store. Id. 
 49 Louis Bien, 49ers’ Levi’s Stadium the 3rd-Biggest Naming Rights Deal in American Sports, SB 
NATION (May 8, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2013/5/8/4313344/49ers-levis-
stadium-biggest-naming-rights-contracts [https://perma.cc/RZY4-U5PH]; Phil W. Hudson & Maria 
Saporta, Blank Confirms Mercedes-Benz Stadium Deal, Reveals New Stadium Pics, ATLANTA BUS. 
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teams, or teams in the largest media markets such as New York and Los Ange-
les, deals approaching and exceeding twenty million dollars per year are not 
out of the question.50 
C. Personal Seat Licenses and Luxury Suites 
As an alternate means of funding, some teams have resorted to the sale of 
personal seat licenses (“PSL”) to solicit contributions from the fans.51 PSLs 
guarantee individual fans the right to purchase season tickets.52 Luxury suites 
function in a similar fashion and allow groups or wealthy individuals to pur-
chase access to any number of reserved, upscale seating.53 Luxury suites often 
include food and beverage service, private access, and many other high-end 
amenities.54 
Although PSLs are usually a one-time purchase when the venue opens, 
luxury suites provide revenues over the life of the venue and can account for 
millions of dollars of revenue annually.55 For example, PSLs for the recently 
constructed Levi’s Stadium sold from anywhere between $2000 and $80,000.56 
                                                                                                                           
CHRON. (Aug. 24, 2015, 10:20 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2015/08/24/blank-
confirms-27-year-naming-rights-deal-of.html [https://perma.cc/CAD6-PJVQ]. 
 50 Hudson & Saporta, supra note 49. For example, Citigroup’s contract to name Citi Field, home 
of the New York Mets, provides the city with twenty million dollars per year over twenty years, as 
does MetLife Insurance’s contract with the MetLife Stadium Company. Id. 
 51 See, e.g., Tyler Lauletta, Warriors Fans Will Reportedly Have to Pay More Than $15,000 for 
the Rights to Buy Season Tickets at New Arena, BUS. INSIDER (July 20, 2017, 4:21 PM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/warriors-personal-seat-licenses-new-stadium-2017-7 [https://perma.cc/VYU9-
BEKX] (discussing how the NBA’s Golden State Warriors intend to finance part of their new stadium 
with PSLs). 
 52 Danette Davis, The Myth & Mystery of Personal Seat Licenses and Season Tickets: Licenses or 
More?, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 241, 242–43 (2003). The specific terms of a PSL vary from franchise to 
franchise. Id. Some provide permanent guarantees while others expire after a term of years. Id. Addi-
tionally, many offer fans the right-of-first-refusal to purchase post-season tickets. Id. at 243. 
 53 Sean Brown, Crowdfunding: The Answer to the Sports Stadium Controversy, 12 WILLAMETTE 
SPORTS L.J. 68, 74 (2015). 
 54 Id. 
 55 See NFL Teams Score Big in the Suite Market, ASS’N OF LUXURY SUITE DIRECTORS, https://
www.alsd.com/content/nfl-teams-score-big-suite-market [https://perma.cc/5BDC-BVUJ] (discussing 
the profitability of suites in NFL stadiums). On the high end, the average cost for an NFL suite is 
$246,712 while the average low-cost suite is $64,597. Id. The total number of suites ranges by stadi-
um, from three hundred suites in Arlington’s AT&T Stadium to eighty suites in the new home of the 
Minnesota Vikings. Id. For more information on the other leagues suite performance, see NBA Teams 
Score Big in the Suite Market, ASS’N OF LUXURY SUITE DIRECTORS, https://www.alsd.com/content/
nba-teams-score-big-suite-market [https://perma.cc/M7R4-ZMEZ]; NHL Teams Score Big in the Suite 
Market, ASS’N OF LUXURY SUITE DIRECTORS, https://www.alsd.com/content/nhl-teams-score-big-
suite-market [https://perma.cc/PG6N-4UY8]. 
 56 Bill Disbrow, 49ers Fans Reselling Seat Licenses for Thousands Less Than They Paid a Year 
Ago, CBS (Mar. 12, 2015, 10:35 AM), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/03/12/49ers-fans-reselling-
seat-licenses-for-thousands-less-than-they-paid-a-year-ago/ [https://perma.cc/U2Y5-SQ3M]. Although 
sound in theory, in practice, PSLs are a risky investment. See id. (discussing how the value declined). 
Purchasers risk losing their rights entirely if they decline to purchase season tickets. Davis, supra note 
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By contrast, luxury suites can cost $5000 to $10,000 per event at certain ven-
ues, such as Quicken Loans Arena—the home of the winners of the 2016 NBA 
Championship: the Cleveland Cavaliers.57 The annual revenues that an indi-
vidual suite draws from sporting events and other events such as concerts or 
monster truck rallies, can easily exceed $200,000.58 For example, the 180 
suites inside of Atlanta’s recently constructed Mercedes-Benz Stadium are 
conservatively estimated to pull in an annual revenue of nearly $40 million.59 
D. Sports and Entertainment Communities 
Another model for sports stadium financing, sports and entertainment 
communities, provide a plethora of benefits and function primarily as center-
pieces of broader surrounding real estate development.60 In recent years, “mas-
ter planned sports and entertainment communities” or “sports communities”—
sports complexes that incorporate multiple alternative forms of entertainment 
or include broader regional and urban development projects—have emerged as 
a means of facilitating stadium finance.61 The ability of additional develop-
ment projects to provide avenues for revenue generation year-round increases 
the attractiveness of sports communities.62 These communities are comprehen-
sive development projects that aim to draw in consumers for commercial activ-
ities other than sporting events.63 
Sports and entertainment communities have increased in popularity, likely 
reflecting a decreased public willingness to subsidize stadium costs.64 They are 
                                                                                                                           
52, at 255. Furthermore, when a franchise struggles, as the NFL’s San Francisco 49ers did in 2016, 
the value of the licenses drops dramatically due to the glut of tickets available on the ticket market. 
C.W. Nevius, 49ers’ Business Model for Stadium Is Fizzling, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 15, 2016, 5:13 PM), 
http://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/nevius/article/49ers-business-model-for-stadium-is-fizzling-
7251897.php [https://perma.cc/L8NZ-ERND]. Furthermore, although venue officials at Levi’s Stadi-
um suggested that they could collect nearly $900 million in revenue from the sale of these PSLs, they 
only collected slightly more than $31 million in 2015. Id. 
 57 See generally Cleveland Cavaliers Suites, SUITE EXPERIENCE GROUP, https://www.suite
experiencegroup.com/allsuites/nba/cleveland-cavaliers/ [https://perma.cc/N38X-FQVM]. Prices vary 
according to the game and the opponent. Id. 
 58 NFL Teams Score Big in the Suite Market, supra note 55. Most teams, however, do not break 
out the percentage of their total revenue attributable to suite purchases. Id. 
 59 See Mercedes-Benz Stadium, STADIUMS OF PRO FOOTBALL, http://www.stadiumsofpro
football.com/stadiums/mercedes-benz-stadium/ [https://perma.cc/Q7JZ-VM2A] (describing funding 
information for Mercedes-Benz Stadium). 
 60 Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 32, at 92. 
 61 Id. at 91; Hanau, supra note 3, at 237–38. 
 62 Hanau, supra note 3, at 246. In addition to the direct revenue generation of sports communities, 
these development projects also provide additional incentive for cities to invest in the needed infra-
structure to support a stadium. Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id.; see Christopher Lee, Creating Communities: Thirty Years of Sports-led Regeneration, 
POPULOUS (Mar. 9, 2015), https://populous.com/posts/creating-communities-thirty-years-of-sports-
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joint ventures between a state or municipality, a sports team, and a developer.65 
Sports communities require significant land-use planning to be successful, 
with an emphasis on finding appropriate land, developing the necessary infra-
structure, and obtaining buy-ins from other investors who will make use of the 
development.66 The success of these communities often depends on the loca-
tion of the development, market timing, a properly marketed and targeted de-
velopment, and, above all, securing the necessary financing.67 They also bene-
fit owners by providing a revenue stream that, unlike television revenues or 
ticket sales, is not shared with other franchises and that operates throughout the 
year.68 
The idea of a sports-centered community—in contrast with previous in-
dustry trends that pushed stadia outside of city limits—emerged in 1993 with 
the failed bid by the owner of the NFL’s New England Patriots, Robert Kraft, 
to construct a one billion dollar stadium and convention center in South Bos-
ton.69 The project never came to fruition due in part to the unwillingness of 
Boston and the state of Massachusetts to provide funding for the venture.70 
Even so, after a brief overture with the city of Hartford, Connecticut, Robert 
Kraft and Massachusetts settled on the construction of the stadium in Fox-
borough.71 The resulting venture, Gillette Stadium and Patriot Place, estab-
lished a model for a new and appealing type of multi-use development.72 
For those who would advocate for stadium development, sports commu-
nities offer an ideal avenue to attract public support: they provide ancillary 
                                                                                                                           
led-regeneration/ [https://perma.cc/UPM5-GZRN] (discussing how sports and entertainment commu-
nities are successful at regeneration urban communities). 
 65 Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 32, at 116; Hanau, supra note 3, at 246. In many cases, the 
developer and the franchise owner are one and the same, though this does not have to be the case. 
Hanau, supra note 3, at 246. Typically, the team owner purchases additional property surrounding the 
stadium, recognizing that the property value increases with the construction of the stadium and ac-
companying infrastructure. Id. Though other methods, such as eminent domain, can be used to acquire 
the necessary property. See generally 730 Equity Corp. v. N.Y. Urban Dev. Corp., 992 N.Y.S.2d 161 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). 
 66 Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 32, at 116. Sports developments can support retail, residen-
tial, recreational, and business facilities. Id. at 115. 
 67 Id.; see, e.g., Brian Adams, Note, Stadium Funding in Massachusetts: Has the Commonwealth 
Found the Balance in Private vs. Public Spending?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 655, 657 (2002) (discussing 
the role of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in developing new stadiums for the MLB’s Boston 
Red Sox and the NFL’s New England Patriots). 
 68 Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 32, at 116; Hanau, supra note 3, at 246. Indeed, some scholars 
suggest sports communities pose a threat to the shared revenue model because they allow the “rich to 
get richer.” Clay Moorhead, Revenue Sharing and the Salary Cap in the NFL: Perfecting the Balance 
Between NFL Socialism and Unrestrained Free-Trade, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 641, 661–62 
(2006). 
 69 Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 32, at 117. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. Patriot Place was designed to be a “self-sustaining, super-regional destination.” Id. at 118. 
2018] Stadium Financing: Why the Agreements Favor Franchises 293 
benefits to the community, they can be used as tools of urban revitalization, 
and they make flashy centerpieces for urban development.73 
II. PUBLIC FUNDING 
Public funding remains the most common and perhaps the most contro-
versial method of funding for the construction of the stadiums of professional 
sports franchises.74 The most recent development in stadium financing in-
volves the relocation of the NFL’s Oakland Raiders from Oakland to Las Vegas 
that will be funded in part by nearly $750 million in public funds.75 During the 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See Elizabeth Taylor, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the Power of Eminent 
Domain, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 1061, 1061 (1995) (discussing how eminent domain can be used to secure 
land for urban revitalization projects). Sports developments can also serve as a “Special Activity Gen-
erator” (“SAG”) by generating additional activity within urban districts that attract visitors from other 
areas of the city and suburbs. Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 32, at 94. Ideally, a SAG will support 
the surrounding commercial areas and eventually invigorate further investment in the area from pri-
vate partners. Id.; see, e.g., Kevin Baxter, Expansion L.A. Soccer Team Plans New Stadium on Sports 
Arena Site, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/sports/soccer/la-sp-la-
soccer-stadium-20150518-story.html [https://perma.cc/PSL7-6NF6] (discussing proposed construc-
tion of privately financed soccer stadium at sports community). Consequently, developing a SAG can 
generate spillover benefits for the surrounding community, spur construction, and potentially revital-
ize blighted communities. Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 32, at 94; see, e.g., James Rizzo, Stadium 
Development and Urban Renewal: A Look at Washington, DC, M.I.T. DEP’T OF ARCH. (2008), 
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/58643/315857329-MIT.pdf?sequence=2 [https://
perma.cc/ATL4-WBT7] (discussing how the NHL’s Washington Capital’s Verizon Center in Wash-
ington, DC revitalized the urban district). But see Stephen Knox, Atlanta’s New Football Stadium 
Promises Urban Renewal, but Locals Have Heard That Before, VICE (May 19, 2016, 1:55 PM), 
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/atlantas-new-football-stadium-promises-urban-renewal-but-
locals-have-heard-that-before [https://perma.cc/8UCH-R9BV] (suggesting that most urban renewal 
promises are overblown, citing Atlanta’s previous stadium as an example). Perhaps the most attractive 
feature of sports communities is their flexibility, as once the SAG is in place, the type of investment—
be it commercial or residential—can adapt based on what succeeds. Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 
32, at 185; Hanau, supra note 3, at 246. This adaptability makes sports developments especially lucra-
tive as an ancillary investment. Hanau, supra note 3. 
 74 See Aaron Gordon, With Raiders Headed to Vegas, the NFL Has Played the New Stadium 
Scam to Perfection, VICE (Mar. 27, 2017, 5:10 PM), https://sports.vice.com/en_us/highlight/with-
raiders-headed-to-vegas-the-nfl-has-played-the-new-stadium-scam-to-perfection [https://perma.cc/
TZG2-55KL] (critiquing the NFL’s success at gaining access to public funds to finance stadiums); Kevin 
Seifert, With $6.7 Billion in Public Money, NFL Closes Stadium Era, ESPN (Mar. 28, 2017), http://
www.espn.com/blog/nflnation/post/_/id/234573/with-6700000000-in-public-money-nfl-stadium-era-
closes [https://perma.cc/6P52-JBSZ] (discussing the vast sums of money that were dedicated to stadi-
um finance in the last decade). 
 75 See Paul Gutierrez, Owners Vote 31–1 to OK Raiders Move; Dolphins Vote Against, ESPN 
(Mar. 27, 2017), http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/19016323/raiders-move-las-vegas-approved-31-1 
[https://perma.cc/59YV-349M] (discussing NFL approval of Raiders relocation). Although the pro-
posed Las Vegas stadium will be partly funded by private contributions from the Raiders organization, 
it will include nearly $750 million in public funds, attributable, at least in part, to an increase in the 
Las Vegas hotel tax. Id. 
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1990’s, an average of sixty-five percent of the costs of public stadiums were 
incurred by taxpayers.76 
Stadiums were not always built with the public tax-dollar in mind.77 For 
much of American sports history, private sources absorbed most, if not all, of 
the costs of constructing stadiums.78 Fledgling sports leagues needed venues 
and the public had yet to buy into the leagues the way it has today.79 Today, the 
bargaining positions have reversed: franchises hold all of the cards while cities 
anxiously wait for them to reveal their hands.80 
This Part will provide a brief overview of the most common forms of 
public financing and will discuss the limitations and concerns with its use.81 
Section A addresses the limitations of public spending and taxation and how 
this applies in the stadium context vis-à-vis the public purpose doctrine.82 Sec-
tion B provides an overview of the basics and utility of municipal tax-exempt 
bonds and discusses how the federal tax code attempts to limit their efficacy in 
financing stadiums.83 Section C discusses the practical justifications for public 
financing and evaluates the circumstances that drive municipalities to provide 
franchise-friendly deals.84 Finally, Section D evaluates the economic justifica-
tions for subsidizing stadium development and considers what effect the con-
struction has upon the taxpayer and the local economy.85 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Scott Jensen, Financing Professional Sports Facilities with Federal Tax Subsidies: Is It Sound 
Tax Policy?, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 425, 427 (2000). 
 77 Arline Schubert, A Taxpayer’s and a Politician’s Dilemma: Use of Eminent Domain to Acquire 
Private Property for Sports Facilities, 86 N.D. L. REV. 845, 849 (2010). 
 78 Alexander K. Gold et al., Why the Federal Government Should Stop Spending Billions on Pri-
vate Sports Stadiums, BROOKINGS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-the-
federal-government-should-stop-spending-billions-on-private-sports-stadiums/ [https://perma.cc/
FF6A-FGNN] (providing data on how stadium finance has changed in the past two decades); Ray-
mond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship between Major League Sports and Govern-
ment, CATO INST. 3–4 (Apr. 5, 1999), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa339.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X8J6-VEJJ]. 
 79 See Keating, supra note 78, at 3–4. The early predecessors to today’s dominant sports leagues 
came about in the early Twentieth Century, including the American Professional Football Association 
(1920) and the combination of the National and American Baseball leagues (1903). Brion Doherty, 
NFL Stadiums and Antitrust: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 39, 42 (2007). 
 80 See PAUL WEILER, LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD: HOW THE LAW CAN MAKE SPORTS BET-
TER FOR FANS 264–65 (2000) (highlighting how the law fails to prevent municipal financing of sports 
facilities and instead serves to further weaken the cities’ bargaining position, resulting in even more 
unfavorable deals). 
 81 See infra notes 74–217 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 86–99 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 100–177 and accompanying text. 
 84 See infra notes 178–187 and accompanying text. 
 85 See infra notes 188–217 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Public Purpose Doctrine 
One challenge to publicly funding stadiums and arenas is the public pur-
pose doctrine.86 Every state requires government funds to be spent for a public 
purpose.87 An analogous requirement exists for municipal borrowing.88 This 
public purpose requirement is analogous to the public use requirement in the 
eminent domain context.89 Public use is thought to be a stricter standard.90 As a 
corollary, public funds cannot be used to promote a purely private interest.91 
Courts vary in their conception of what constitutes a valid public purpose.92 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Goodman, supra note 5, at 179. 
 87 See, e.g., Town of Gila Bend v. Walled Lake Door Co., 490 P.2d 551, 555 (Ariz. 1971) (hold-
ing that public funds are to be expended only for “public purposes”); Arens v. Village of Rogers, 61 
N.W.2d 508, 519 (Minn. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 949 (1954) (“It is well settled that the 
legislature cannot authorize or require the expenditure of public funds by a municipal subdivision of 
the state for any purpose not essentially of a public nature.”). The public purpose doctrine originated 
in the 1853 Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia where the court 
found that legislatures cannot take on debt for a purely private purpose. 21 Pa. 147, 168 (1853). There 
are several reasons to support a strong public purpose doctrine: 1) to protect private enterprise from 
government intrusion into the marketplace, 2) protect the taxpayer from speculative or inefficient 
government borrowing, and 3) prevent public officials from rewarding self-aggrandizement. 4 JOHN 
MARTINEZ, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 25:6, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2017). Alternatively, 
local government’s indebtedness may be controlled by constitutional restrictions, either in the form 
delineating limits to a government’s ability to take on debt, or by requiring voter approval as a condi-
tion precedent to incurring debt. Id. Where the financing of stadium construction was secured by rev-
enues produced by the stadium, however, courts have sometimes concluded that the indebtedness was 
not of the type contemplated by the constitutional restraints. See, e.g., Alan v. County of Wayne, 200 
N.W.2d 628, 681 (Mich. 1972) (citing Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547 (Mass. 1969)); Gins-
berg v. City of Denver, 436 P.2d 685, 692 (Colo. 1968). 
 88 See, e.g., Bybee v. City of Minneapolis, 292 N.W. 617, 617 (Minn. 1940) (overturning issuance 
of bonds to finance construction of private railroad bridges); Carothers v. Town of Booneville, 153 
So. 670, 671–72 (Miss. 1934) (striking down use of bonds for construction of private factory for the 
purpose of increasing employment); Hornstein v. Lister, 96 N.Y.S.2d 269, 269 (N.Y. App. Div.), 
aff’d, 93 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1950) (overruling use of bonds to assist in leasing private property). 
 89 Compare Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (holding that review of pub-
lic use justification is “an extremely narrow one” and requires that the judiciary ought not substitute 
their judgment for legislature’s unless the use “be palpably without reasonable justification”) (internal 
quotations omitted), with Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (holding that a court must 
determine whether the power to tax and spend was an exercise for benefit of the general as opposed to 
favored few), and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 76–78 (1936) (implying that the “general wel-
fare” restraint on power to tax and spend was real limitation, but that original meaning was disputed 
by the framers). Even so, the Court has not subsequently drawn this line as stringently as it suggested 
in Helvering. 301 U.S. at 640; see, e.g., Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 515 (1937) 
(holding that public purpose is a practical question for the legislature). 
 90 See, e.g., Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 21–23 (Me. 1983) (finding that the taxing and 
taking powers are subject to different standards, and can be applied more liberally as it pertains to 
public use in takings cases). 
 91 4-67 CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 67.04, Lexis (da-
tabase updated Sept. 2017). The public purpose doctrine is distinct from the stricter “public use” 
standard employed in eminent domain proceedings. Id. 
 92 See, e.g., Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Ranken, 105 A.2d 614, 619 (Del. Ch. 1954) (“[T]he 
phrase ‘public purpose’ is not susceptible of precise definition, and it is not possible to adopt a rigid 
296 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:281 
The public purpose doctrine embodies the idea that although expenditures can 
indirectly benefit private interests, the primary purpose must be for some pub-
lic good.93 
Courts today, however, generally view public purpose more liberally than 
their predecessors and have been reluctant to impose a strict interpretation.94 In 
case after case, courts have granted legislatures wide latitude in determining 
what constitutes a public purpose and the holdings often turn on deferential 
readings of legislative history and congressional findings.95 
For example, in 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Poe v. Hills-
borough County, held that the issuance of bonds to finance one hundred per-
cent of the cost of the to-be-constructed Raymond James Stadium constituted a 
valid public use.96 Even despite the obvious private benefit to the franchise 
owner, the court held that the development of “recreational facilities” consti-
tuted a public purpose.97 Even where the financial arrangements disadvantage 
a public entity, it is not clear that a court would find a lack of public purpose.98 
This case demonstrates the extreme judicial deference to elected legislatures 
and recognition that their power over the purse is controlled through the ballot 
box.99 
                                                                                                                           
rule by which to determine whether a purpose is to be held for public or private.”); Opinion of the 
Justices, 208 N.E.2d 823, 826 (Mass. 1965) (“[A] direct public benefit of a reasonably general charac-
ter . . . as distinguished from a remote or theoretical benefit.”) (internal quotations omitted); Opinion 
to the Governor, 69 A.2d 531, 534 (R.I. 1949) (finding that there can be a public use where the gov-
ernment provides facilities for public convenience or welfare if it is difficult or impossible to be pro-
vided otherwise). 
 93 4-67 ANTIEAU, supra note 91, § 67.04. 
 94 See, e.g., City of Frostburg v. Jenkins, 136 A.2d 852, 855 (Md. 1957) (concluding that public 
purpose changes based upon differences in the social and economic conditions with which the gov-
ernment is concerned). Common Cause, 455 A.2d at 24 (establishing that what constitutes a public 
purpose is not set in stone and that even if something was not a public use in the past, it could very 
well be a public use today). 
 95 See, e.g., Barnes v. City of New Haven, A.2d 523, 528 (Conn. 1953) (stating that it is the job of 
the legislature to determine what constitutes a public purpose, and that this determination should only 
be overturned if it is patently wrong); Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 621 (N.C. 
1996) (holding that legislative determinations should be weighted heavily). 
 96 695 So. 2d 672, 676 (Fla. 1997). 
 97 Id. (citing State v. City of Daytona Beach, 33 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1948)). 
 98 See King County v. Taxpayers of King Cty., 949 P.2d 1260, 1267–69 (Wash. 1997) (reciting 
taxpayer assertion that city’s deal with the Mariners constituted an illusory promise or an illusion, 
holding that the court could not consider the wisdom or intelligence of the county’s plan). 
 99 See id. at 1267–69. One problem with holding legislators accountable for their votes supporting 
public subsidies is that supporters of stadium subsidies are far more likely to spend money to support 
the initiative than opponents are willing to fight it. Marc Edelman, How to Curb Professional Sports’ 
Bargaining Power Vis-à-vis the American City, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 280, 292 (2003). 
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B. Federal Tax-Exempt Financing 
Federal tax-exempt bonds were among the most common forms of financ-
ing for public stadiums in the 1970’s and early 1980’s.100 Prior to the 1950’s, 
team owners generally bore the whole cost of funding and constructing stadi-
ums.101 The 1950’s brought on the marriage between sports and government 
that still endures today.102 Between 1953 and 1979, thirty professional sports 
stadiums were built, and nearly seventy percent of the costs were borne by the 
taxpayer.103 Although the percentage of total stadium costs covered by public 
financing options has declined in recent years, the overall costs have not, as 
newer stadiums provide more elaborate and more expensive amenities to at-
tract fans, tourists, and marquee events such as the Super Bowl, NCAA Final 
Four, and NCAA College Football National Championship.104 Section 1 below 
will provide an overview of the mechanics of tax-exempt municipal bonds.105 
Section 2 will then discuss the restraints on the use of tax-exempt bonds.106 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Edelman, supra note 99, at 288. Although the trend toward municipality-funded stadiums 
began in the 1950s when Milwaukee spent general tax dollars to construct County Stadium for its 
professional baseball team, the real explosion in stadium development—and league expansion—did 
not begin until the 1960s. Id. at 286, 288. 
 101 Schubert, supra note 77, at 849. America’s first publicly funded stadium, the Los Angeles 
Memorial Coliseum, was built in 1923 and is still in use today. Id. At the time, the stadium was built 
in preparation for the 1924 Los Angeles Olympic bid. Id. Both Fenway Park and Wrigley Field were 
built around the same time period with solely private funding. Id. As the continued use of these ven-
ues demonstrates, the idea of a long shelf-life for professional stadiums may not be as far-fetched as it 
seems. Id. 
 102 Id. (citing Brett Smith, If You Build It, Will They Come? The Relationship Between Public 
Financing of Sports Facilities and Quality of Life in America’s Cities, 7 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 45, 45 
(2001)). 
 103 Keating, supra note 78, at 12–13. 
 104 See College Football Playoff: Sites Announced for 2018–2020, NCAA (Nov. 4, 2016), http://
www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2015-11-04/college-football-playoff-sites-announced-2018-2020 
[https://perma.cc/ZT79-MK5K] (announcing that several newly constructed or newly renovated stadi-
ums would host the college football playoff); Five Future Final Four Sites Announced, NCAA (Nov. 
14, 2014, 9:20 PM), http://www.ncaa.com/futurefinalfour [https://perma.cc/W75R-6UJT] (providing 
locations of upcoming Final Four tournaments); Timothy Rapp, Super Bowl 2019, 2020, and 2021 
Dates, Locations Announced by NFL, BLEACHER REP. (May 24, 2016), http://bleacherreport.com/
articles/2642100-super-bowl-2019-2020-and-2021-dates-locations-announced-by-nfl [https://perma.
cc/YTN6-8L75] (noting that several newly constructed or newly renovated stadiums would host the 
college football playoff). There appears to be a pattern in awarding Super Bowl bids, as all three an-
nounced hosts had either recently completed a new stadium or had undertaken significant renovations. 
Jenna Laine (@jennalaineespn), TWITTER (May 24, 2016, 5:01 PM), https://twitter.com/JennaLaine
ESPN/status/735214138515918854?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw [https://perma.cc/D7M2-CUYY]. 
 105 See infra notes 107–141 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 142–177 and accompanying text. 
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1. Tax-Exempt Bonds: How Do They Work? 
Like any large real estate development project, stadiums require land, ex-
tensive financing, permitting, and detailed studies to determine the impact that 
the construction would have on the environment, transportation, infrastructure, 
and on the community.107 State and municipal governments have, for some 
time, used tax-exempt development bonds to finance the cost of constructing 
sports stadiums.108 
Typically, municipalities employ one of two types of bonds to finance 
large-scale projects: 1) general obligation bonds or 2) revenue bonds.109 Gen-
eral obligation bonds (sometimes known as “full-faith-and-credit bonds”) are 
the broadest and most secure type of borrowing available to municipal gov-
ernments.110 They are backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing enti-
ty.111 This security is especially apparent as it pertains to state-issued general 
obligation bonds because states cannot declare bankruptcy.112 Lending entities 
view municipal projects as safe investments because general obligation bonds 
are secured by the municipality’s general taxing power, thus encouraging their 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Anoop Bhasin, Tax-Exempt Bond Financing of Sports Stadiums: Is the Price Right, 7 VILL. 
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 185 (2000). 
 108 Id. at 182. 
 109 Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local Government 
Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for Reform, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1455, 1465–66 (2013). Municipal bonds experienced a rapid increase in popularity during the 
mid-1970s as municipalities sought new ways to finance the growing needs for infrastructure and 
public services. Id. at 1458. As of 2013, there were $3.7 trillion in outstanding municipal bonds. Id. In 
comparison, there was $235 billion in total outstanding municipal bonds in 1975. Id. 
 110 Joshua Kennon, Municipal Bonds: Revenue vs. General Obligation, THE BALANCE (Sept. 29, 
2016), https://www.thebalance.com/general-obligation-vs-revenue-municipal-bonds-357926 [https://
perma.cc/MYF2-7AZ8]. A general obligation bond is a debt instrument representing a monetary obli-
gation insured by a government’s taxing power. Id. General obligation bonds derive much of their 
security from the way they are issued. Id. Because most general obligation bonds are issued only after 
taxpayers vote on their issuance, the general population is often committed to the expenditure. Id. 
Secondly, municipalities frequently build-in more than sufficient assets into the issuance language, 
providing investors assurance of repayment. Id. In recent years, however, prominent municipal bank-
ruptcies have called into question the security afforded by general obligation bonds. See generally 
Randall Pollard, Feeling Insecure—A State View of Whether Investors in Municipal General Obliga-
tion Bonds Have a Mere Promise to Pay or a Binding Obligation, 24 WIDENER L.J. 19 (2015) (dis-
cussing how Detroit’s filing for municipal bankruptcy has contributed to the continuing controversy as 
to whether general obligation bondholders have a secured lien). Though general obligation bonds 
require a municipality to pledge their “full faith and credit,” without the creation of a lien by state law, 
during financial distress or bankruptcy, municipalities may leave investors holding mere promises to 
pay. See generally id. (discussing the effects of municipal bankruptcy). This increases not only the 
risk of loss to investors, but also the cost of borrowing for all municipalities—even those who may 
truly pledge their full faith and credit. Id. at 21–22. This recent development “jeopardizes” a primary 
means of financing public services and infrastructure. Id. 
 111 Kennon, supra note 110. 
 112 Chung, supra note 109, at 1470. 
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purchase.113 That being said, non-state issuers, may, in some circumstances, 
seek bankruptcy protection under chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code.114 
General obligation bonds can be further divided into two sub-categories: 
1) unlimited-tax general obligation bonds and 2) limited-tax general obligation 
bonds.115 Municipalities back unlimited-tax general obligation bonds with their 
entire taxing power and may use sales taxes, sin taxes, or any other sources of 
revenue to repay the investors.116 By contrast, limited tax general obligation 
bonds are backed by a specific tax power, such as a ten cent soda tax or a spe-
cial property tax.117 Municipalities frequently issue both types of bonds when 
raising money to finance stadium construction.118 
Tax increment financing is also attractive in the stadium finance context, 
however it may run afoul of the tax-exempt requirements.119 It is one promi-
nent use of limited tax general obligations bonds.120 Tax increment financing 
plans allow a local government unit to freeze the assessed property value in an 
underdeveloped area and apply any future increase in property tax revenue 
directly to development projects in that particular area.121 The development 
                                                                                                                           
 113 4 MARTINEZ, supra note 87, § 25:5. Federal law regulating the use of municipal bonds has 
typically taken an investor-centric approach. Chung, supra note 109, at 1461–62. Federal regulatory 
policy rarely considers the risks faced by non-investor stakeholders, such as municipal governments 
and taxpayers. Id. Because general obligation bonds typically require the full faith and credit of mu-
nicipalities, in the event that the revenues used for bond service decline, they must use their taxing 
power or reduce spending on other needed infrastructure or services. Id. This reality can have tragic 
results when recession strikes, as taxpayers must either contribute more relative income to service 
municipal bonds, or face cuts to needed services. Id. 
 114 Chung, supra note 109, at 1470–71. Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy code imposes several re-
strictions on the eligibility of municipalities to declare bankruptcy. Id. at 1470–71. “Political . . . reali-
ties,” however, frequently prevent municipalities from declaring bankruptcy. Id. at 1472 (citing former 
Massachusetts Representative Barney Frank’s statement that “[n]o State, no State legislators, no gov-
ernor, can allow any one of its municipalities to default because then every other municipality would 
pay through the nose”). 
 115 See Kennon, supra note 110. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. Typically, using these funds, the municipality establishes a development authority, and 
may even establish multiple development authorities with varying development goals. Laura Bassett, 
Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Redevelopment: Attracting Private Investment to Serve a Pub-
lic Purpose—The Example of Michigan, 41 URB. LAW. 755, 755 (2009). Once the municipality ap-
proves the tax increment financing (“TIF”) plan, they issue limited tax general obligations bonds se-
cured by the expected increases in property tax revenues. Id. at 759. 
 118 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 182. 
 119 See, e.g., Jessie Van Berkel, St. Paul Studies Tax Increment Financing at Site Around Soccer 
Stadium, STAR TRIB. (Minnesota) (Sept. 14, 2017), http://www.startribune.com/st-paul-studies-tax-
increment-financing-at-site-around-soccer-stadium/444292773/ [https://perma.cc/JJE7-X9YC] (dis-
cussing how St. Paul is investigating the use of TIF to construct a new soccer stadium for an MLS 
team). 
 120 See Bassett, supra note 117, at 755 (discussing how TIF uses limited tax general obligation 
bonds). 
 121 Id. at 757. 
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authority then employs the funds to stimulate private development and public 
improvements within the designated geographic area.122 
Alternatively, a municipality may employ revenue bonds.123 Revenue 
bonds are bonds payable from the income of the projects financed by the bond 
proceeds.124 As opposed to general obligation bonds, revenue bond holders 
retain no claim over the funds and property of the municipality.125 Nor do rev-
enue bonds result in general obligations upon the municipality.126 Instead, their 
repayment is payable entirely from the revenue producing project.127 Unlike 
general obligation bonds, taxpayer approval of the issuance may not be re-
quired.128 The revenue used to finance revenue bonds usually comes from a 
dedicated tax, but generally serves to limit the imposition of the tax burden to a 
particular source.129 The federal government regulates the circumstances under 
which municipalities may issue these bonds, in addition to relevant state re-
strictions.130 Revenue bonds are frequently used to finance stadium construc-
tion.131 
Interest from municipal bonds is excluded from gross income under cer-
tain, specified conditions.132 Section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code 
(“IRC”) provides that gross income does not include interest on any state or 
political subdivision bond, except for a private activity bond that is not a quali-
fied bond.133 Qualified bonds issued to pay for stadium construction and reno-
vation could fit in this exemption so long as they avoid characterization as a 
                                                                                                                           
 122 Id. at 759. 
 123 15 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 43:14, Westlaw (database 
updated July 2017). Revenue bonds may be classified as a sub-category of special obligation bonds 
alongside revenue certificates, or “contract debts,” alternatively referred to as “self-liquidating bonds.” 
Id. 
 124 Id. Theoretically, over the life of the facility, the project should generate sufficient revenues to 
amortize the issued debt. Chung, supra note 109, at 1466. Consequently, revenue bonds have seen 
frequent use in the construction of projects such as toll roads, toll bridges, utilities, and the like. Id. 
 125 15 MCQUILLIN, supra note 123, § 43:14. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. Some municipalities may subsidize payments from the dedicated revenue with general tax 
revenue. See Ann Judith Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities: A Reevaluation, 36 
BUFF. L. REV. 15, 23 (1987). This is especially true during the development phase of a project as the 
dedicated revenues have yet to accrue. Id. 
 128 Chung, supra note 109, at 1466. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 182. Tax-exempt bonds became a subject for federal regulation 
after the Supreme Court in 1895, in Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., ruled that the federal gov-
ernment had the authority to permit state and municipal governments to finance the development of 
various utility projects with them. 157 U.S. 429, 585–89 (1895). The Supreme Court later ruled that 
the federal government could regulate the issuance of these bonds in 1988, in South Carolina v. 
Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515 (1988) (upholding the constitutionality of Tenth Amendment claim). 
 131 See Bhasin, supra note 107, at 182 (noting that states “emphasize the use of” revenue bonds 
“to finance sports stadiums”). 
 132 See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2012). 
 133 Id. 
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private activity bond.134 Stadiums can benefit from this exemption despite their 
overwhelmingly private usage.135 As a consequence, issuers benefit from a re-
duction in bond-servicing cost.136 This means that lower than market bond in-
terest rates still provide a market yield to the purchaser because of the de-
creased tax burden.137 Aside from the obvious reduced tax yield, this has an 
augmented effect over the life of the bond.138 For example, a $225 million sta-
dium, completely financed with government bonds, would result in lost tax 
revenues of $75 million.139 When you consider that the most recent stadiums 
constructed for NFL franchises cost $1.7 billion and $1.2 billion, the immense 
tax cost becomes apparent.140 Because both revenue bonds and general obliga-
tion municipal bonds are eligible for tax-exempt interest, they are vital vehi-
cles to raise the capital used in the construction of a new or renovated stadi-
um.141 
2. Restraints on the Use of Tax-Exempt Bonds for Venue Financing 
The use of tax-exempt bonds to finance stadiums caught the eyes of the 
U.S. Congress once before.142 Federal restraints on the issuance of tax-exempt 
development bonds went through two rounds of revision in the 1980s as Con-
gress sought to discourage their use in subsidizing private projects and reduce 
the lost tax revenue inherent in issuing tax-exempt bonds.143 The first revision 
set the stage for the subsequent targeting of tax-exempt bond financing for sta-
dium projects.144 
Congress revised the IRC with the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (“1984 
Act”) in part to slow the issuance of tax-exempt industrial development bonds, 
                                                                                                                           
 134 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 183 (discussing how municipalities fit their bonds within the tax-
exempt requirements). 
 135 See id. (discussing how municipalities fit their bonds within the tax-exempt requirements). 
 136 How Do Municipal Bonds Work?, MUNICIPALBONDS.COM (June 24, 2015), http://www.
municipalbonds.com/education/the-basics-of-municipal-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/4XEF-3U62]. 
 137 Jensen, supra note 76, at 430. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 See Marcin, supra note 46 (discussing the cost of Mercedes-Benz Stadium); NFL Stadium 
Funding Information, supra note 23 (providing the costs of recent stadium projects). 
 141 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB NO. 4079, TAX-EXEMPT GOVERNMENTAL BONDS 4 
(2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4079.pdf [https://perma.cc/94DX-ZML7] (discussing how 
tax-exempt bonds can be used for municipal projects). 
 142 Goodman, supra note 5, at 182. 
 143 Id. This first attempt at targeting lavish spending in stadium finance was largely successful. Id. 
This revision reduced the volume of qualified private activity bonds. Bhasin, supra note 107, at 183. 
Qualified private activity bonds form a sub-category of development bonds that provide interest ex-
cluded from gross income. 1 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 8:48, Westlaw (data-
base updated Dec. 2017). 
 144 Goodman, supra note 5, at 182; see infra notes 156–177 (discussing the 1986 revision to the 
Internal Revenue Code). 
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but in doing so, largely ignored the benefits and uses of these bonds for urban 
re-development projects.145 Industrial development bonds are a type of bond—
distinct from general obligation bonds and revenue bonds—used to assist a pri-
vate actor that is unwilling or otherwise unable to finance a project.146 Ostensi-
bly, they were used to improve the economic condition of the relevant area.147 
The 1984 Act contained two main restrictions on the use of industrial de-
velopment bonds.148 First, it imposed a volume limitation by capping the use 
of bonds under section 146 of the IRC, restricting the state’s capacity to issue 
these bonds.149 Notably, at that time, the IRC did not prohibit the use of these 
tax-exempt bonds for the construction of private stadiums because the private 
purpose remained a qualified use.150 
Secondly, the 1984 Act revised section 141 of IRC to “prohibit[] . . . the 
use of bond proceeds to acquire land, currently used properties, and other facil-
ities.”151 Consequently, politicians were forced to rely on eminent domain au-
thority to acquire the necessary land for future projects—increasing the cost of 
construction.152 Furthermore, the measure restricted the ability to use bond fi-
nance to construct luxury boxes and health facilities in stadiums—components 
at the heart of the need for the new construction to begin with.153 Although 
these amendments reduced the tax subsidy afforded by the federal government, 
                                                                                                                           
 145 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 183; see I.R.C. § 141(b)-(d) (2012) (enumerating private business 
test, private security or payment test, and private loan financing test). See generally I.R.C. §§ 141–147 
(establishing limitation on the use of “private activity bonds”). For a discussion of what constitutes a 
private activity bond see infra notes 159–177 and accompanying text. 
 146 Industrial Development Revenue Bonds—IDRBs, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.
com/terms/i/idrb.asp [https://perma.cc/3UF4-HEGH]. 
 147 Stan Provus, CDFA Spotlight: The Basics of Industrial Development Bonds, CDFA (July 7, 
2006), https://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/0/BE597705BA591F2588257936005F06C3 [https://
perma.cc/294P-P6WL]. 
 148 See I.R.C. § 146(b)(1). 
 149 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 183–84; see I.R.C. § 146(b)(1) (setting the cap at 50% of state ceil-
ing on bond issuance for any given year). In other words, state’s set limitations on the issuance of tax-
exempt bonds, and any individual state entity can only issue up to 50% of that cap. I.R.C. § 146(a), 
(b)(1). 
 150 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 183. 
 151 Id. Section 141 defines what constitutes a private activity bond, provides the exceptions on 
what constitutes a private activity bonds, and defines what constitutes a qualified bond. I.R.C. § 141. 
 152 Birch, supra note 9, at 193–195 (discussing the economic costs and benefits of using eminent 
domain to secure land for the construction of a football stadium). In many cases, issuing bonds would 
reduce the cost to the municipality because they would be able to avoid the litigation costs associated 
with eminent domain proceedings. This is not true where the land is held by many individual land-
owners. See Chen, supra note 73, at 469 (explaining the high cost of eminent domain proceedings). 
 153 Goodman, supra note 5, at 182; see Robinson, supra note 8, at 144–45 (noting that skyboxes 
and other luxury amenities are major contributors to the cost of professional stadiums, but also are key 
to prospective profitability); John D. Finerty, Jr., Comment, Subverting the Internal Revenue Code in 
the “Game” of Sports Stadium Financing, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 301, 308 (1991) (discussing how 
parties avoided the restraints on suite construction). 
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they had the side effect of passing those costs on to local taxpayers.154 The idea 
was that when municipalities financed these projects, they no longer received 
the beneficial treatment afforded by the IRC, therefore, when the bonds be-
came due, the additional debt service required by bond-holders would be satis-
fied with local tax revenue.155 
In 1986, the landscape of available public finance changed dramatical-
ly.156 Congress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in an attempt to restrict the 
benefit to private corporations, and in particular, to professional sports fran-
chises, due to the federal tax-exempt bond structure.157 The broad goal was to 
eliminate the issuance of private activity bonds for the construction of sports 
stadiums by implementing more stringent public use requirements.158 
To qualify for tax-exempt status, Congress implemented the “Private Ac-
tivity Test.”159 The first prong, the “business use” test, required that no more 
than ten percent of the bond proceeds be used for the benefit of a private busi-
ness.160 The second prong, the “security” test, restricted tax-exempt bonds to 
only those bonds where less than ten percent of the bond principal was secured 
by an interest in property used for private business or by revenues from such 
property.161 Thus, the “security” test prohibits revenue derived from rents or 
other value procured by an interest in the property.162 The second prong, how-
ever, resulted in a counterintuitive outcome:163 rather than encouraging public 
entities to seek beneficial rental agreements with the franchise lessees, the ten 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 184–85; see infra notes 178–187 and accompanying text. 
 155 Scott Greenberg, Reexamining the Tax Exemption of Municipal Bond Interest, TAX FOUNDA-
TION (July 21, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/reexamining-tax-exemption-municipal-bond-interest/ 
[https://perma.cc/D5Q7-FMNQ] (suggesting that tax-exemptions for municipal bonds amount to sub-
sidies for local governments). 
 156 Goodman, supra note 5, at 182. The bill’s sponsor, New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moyni-
han stated that the purpose of the revision was to “eliminate tax-exempt financing of professional 
sports facilities [entirely].” 142 CONG. REC. 6306 (1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). 
 157 Goodman, supra note 5, at 183. 
 158 142 CONG. REC. 6306 (1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan); see WEILER, supra note 80, at 
264–65 (highlighting how the law failed to prevent municipal finance of sports facilities and instead 
only served to further weaken cities’ bargaining position and resulted in even more unfavorable 
deals). 
 159 See I.R.C. § 141 (providing the private activity test). 
 160 Id. § 141(b)(1). Private business use is defined as any “use (directly or indirectly) in a trade or 
business carried on by any person other than a governmental unit,” and not used by a member of the 
general public. Id. § 141(b)(6)(A). 
 161 Id. § 141(b)(2). The statute provides: “if the payment of principal of, or interest on, more than 
10 percent of the proceeds of a bond issue is directly or indirectly-(A)(i) secured by any interest in the 
property used or (ii) payments in respect of such property or (B) derived from payments in respect of 
such property, or borrowed money, used or to be used in a private business use.” Id. 
 162 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 187. 
 163 Frank A. Mayer, III, Stadium Financing: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where We 
Are Going, 12 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 195, 210 (2005) (discussing how the change in the tax treat-
ment resulted in municipalities merely changing the method of debt repayment, rather than ceasing the 
problematic funding altogether); Gold et al., supra note 78. 
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percent security restriction prevented them from doing so.164 Municipalities 
could no longer use the rents derived from stadium leases to pay down more 
than ten percent of the debt service if they wished to qualify for the tax-exempt 
bonds.165 
Alternatively, a limitation on the issuance of these bonds exists where 
private activity bonds become non-qualified—private activity bonds not af-
forded the Federal tax exemption for their interest—if they are so characterized 
under the private loan-financing test.166 The private loan financing test is trig-
gered only where the municipal entity used the bond proceeds to loan directly 
to a private party and loan amount exceeds the relevant statutory amount.167 
This test is more limited than the private business test of the first prong in that 
the municipality must offer a direct or indirect loan therein triggering the ap-
plication of section 141(c) of the IRC.168 This two-pronged test limited the op-
tions available for stadium financing, and direct lending to private sports fran-
chises has long been out of the question.169 
Instead of preventing stadium developers from using tax-exempt bonds for 
an ostensibly private purpose, developers and franchises alike re-characterized 
their bonds to fall under the new tax-exempt definition.170 Other franchises and 
                                                                                                                           
 164 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 187–88; Goodman, supra note 5, at 184. Daniel J. Lathrope, Feder-
al Tax Policy, Tax Subsidies, and the Financing of Professional Sports Facilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 
1147, 1156–58 (1997). In fact, the 1986 tax code revision marks the beginning of the current era of 
sports finance, dominated by the exponentially rising costs of stadium finance, unprecedented stadium 
construction. Goodman, supra note 5, at 184. In fact, some scholars have suggested that municipal 
debt-financing necessarily results in favorable terms to the professional sports tenant because it places 
the tax burden directly on the shoulders of the taxpayer. Dennis Zimmerman, Subsidizing Stadiums, in 
SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 119, 137–38 
(Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997). 
 165 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 145, at 5. 
 166 I.R.C. § 141(c). 
 167 Id. § 141(b)(3). Precisely, “if the amount of the proceeds of the issue which are to be used 
(directly or indirectly) to make or finance loans (other than loans described in paragraph (2) to persons 
other than governmental units exceeds the lesser of (A) five percent of such proceeds, or (B) 
$ 5,000,000” then the bond would be non-qualified. Id. § 141(c). The IRS also suggests that indirect 
benefits could also trigger this test. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 145, at 5. 
 168 Compare I.R.C. § 141(b)(1) (establishing the private activity test for bond issuance), with Id. 
§ 141(c) (laying out restraints on direct lending). 
 169 Marc Edelman, Sports and the City: How to Curb Professional Sports Teams’ Demands for 
Free Public Stadiums, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 57 (2008); see Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to 
Professional Sports Teams—A Constitutional Disgrace: The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and 
State Constitutional Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. 
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 170 DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AND THE ECONOMICS 
OF PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS 5–6 (1996). 
2018] Stadium Financing: Why the Agreements Favor Franchises 305 
state and municipal entities simply rushed their stadium projects to market, 
resulting in many of the bond issuances being grandfathered in to the tax-
exempt provisions.171 State and municipal governments, however, would not 
be denied the opportunity to participate in the “big leagues” and in order to do 
so, they turned to the taxpayer for funding: financing the tax-exempt bonds 
through general obligation tax funds, and restricting the portion of the bonds 
funded through revenue generated by the venue.172 
By forcing interested states and municipalities to turn to general tax reve-
nue for stadium financing, Congress unintentionally shifted the tax burden 
away from the franchises themselves and onto other taxpayers.173 Rather than 
discouraging municipalities from subsidizing the cost of stadiums, public sup-
port for professional stadiums increased.174 
For example, in funding the construction of AT&T Stadium, home of the 
NFL’s Dallas Cowboys, the city of Arlington, Texas secured their municipal 
bonds by raising the sales tax one half of one cent, raising the hotel-motel tax 
by 2%, and additionally raising the rental car tax rate by 5%.175 All in all, mu-
nicipal bonds accounted for a taxpayer check worth $325 million to the Dallas 
Cowboys.176 Ironically, rather than protecting municipal taxpayers, the 1986 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Bhasin, supra note 107, at 184. 
 172 Jensen, supra note 76, at 433; Mayer, supra note 163, at 210–11 (discussing how municipali-
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 173 Jensen, supra note 76, at 433. Sales taxes, tourist taxes, sin taxes, and lodging taxes were all 
popular tax alternatives. Id. at 430. Other methods include lotteries, ticket surcharges and others. See, 
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 174 Courtney Gesualdi, Sports Stadiums as Public Works Projects: How to Stop Professional 
Teams from Exploiting Taxpayers, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 281, 284 (2014). Congress attempted to 
limit the ability to pass on the cost to taxpayers by allowing for voter referenda, these referenda fre-
quently face the practical challenges raised by few, vocal, direct beneficiaries and a disparate, often 
quiet, tax-bearing public. See Jensen, supra note 76, at 434 (discussing the limitations of voter refer-
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 175 Skip Sauer, Cowboys Stadium Financing, SPORTS ECONOMIST (July 11, 2010), http://
thesportseconomist.com/2010/07/11/cowboys-stadium-financing/ [https://perma.cc/TSP5-QC74]. The 
city of Arlington did, however, tax some of the immediate beneficiaries of the stadium by imposing a 
three-dollar parking tax and a 10% ticket tax. Id. 
 176 Id. 
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amendment encouraged aggressive exploitation of primarily regressive, non-
business related bond service.177 
C. Why Public Funding? 
The need for public financing of professional stadiums reflects the reality 
that the market for professional franchises is a seller’s market.178 Franchises 
hold all of the cards because there are only so many of them to go around—
thirty-two in the NFL, thirty-one in the NHL, thirty in the MLB, and thirty in 
the NBA.179 That’s not to say it has to be this way; American sports are peculi-
ar in their socialist approach to competition.180 Where European teams move 
up and down the ranks based on their competitive success, American teams are 
permanent fixtures that, although identified with a community, are controlled 
by the league and the budget of the owners.181 
Cities that refuse to play ball with the leagues or their aggressive owners 
often either lose their beloved franchise or never have the opportunity to attract 
one in the first place.182 The federally sanctioned sports monopolies are, with-
out question, a major factor in the stadium arms race.183 In fact, there is strong 
                                                                                                                           
 177 Robinson, supra note 8, at 155. Even more problematic, the regressive taxation commonly 
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 178 Edelman, supra note 169, at 37. 
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 180 Derek Thompson, Why American Sports Are Socialist, THE ATLANTIC (June 20, 2016), http://
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/why-american-sports-are-socialist/487640/ [https://
perma.cc/2WH2-T767]. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Edelman, supra note 169, at 37, 48. 
 183 Id. at 37; Rodney Fort, Direct Democracy and the Stadium Mess, in SPORTS, JOBS & TAXES: 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS, supra note 164, at 140 (discussing how 
owners through their leagues’ collective authority, limit the number of teams in the leagues intention-
ally rather than leaving the results to natural competition). Fort suggests that two indicators illustrate 
the leagues’ restraint of competition. Id. First, that occasionally competing leagues do form, and sec-
ond that when the leagues announce an intention to expand, there are numerous buyers for the league 
to choose from. Id. A case study of the MLB during the 1960s demonstrates just that when the supply 
of MLB teams jumped from sixteen to twenty-four teams, the rate of stadium subsidies fell from the 
high nineties to approximately 60%. John Siegfried & Andrew Zimbalist, The Economics of Sports 
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evidence to suggest that the professional leagues deliberately under-supply 
professional franchises in order to hold the threat of relocation over loyal fan-
bases to ensure high value public subsidies.184 
The winds of public financing, however, have begun to change.185 The fi-
nancial crisis of  2008 and resulting recession forced municipalities to become 
more frugal.186 Citizen pressure on municipal governments, due in part to ani-
mosity toward subsidizing “billionaire owners,” and limited state and municipal 
resources have necessitated a shift away from fully publicly funded projects.187 
D. The Public Benefits of Professional Franchises: Are They Real? 
It would seem intuitive that the construction of a professional stadium and 
existence of a professional franchise would provide a net boost to the local 
economy.188 Indeed, the construction of a stadium requires countless jobs to be 
filled, including riveters, contractors, engineers, architects, and electricians.189 
Further, some scholars claim that for every dollar spent on professional sports, 
nearly $1.75 is returned to the economy.190 Additionally, stadiums can serve as 
cornerstones of economic revitalization projects by transforming blighted 
communities into attractive destinations.191 
                                                                                                                           
Facilities and Their Communities, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 95, 96 (2000). The inter-league competition 
demonstrates just how the league monopoly contributes to the higher subsidy rates for professional 
venues. Id. The MLB expansion of the 1960s came in direct response to the potential launch of the 
rival Continental League, and once that proposal was abandoned, the next wave of expansion found a 
willing market of buying cities looking to establish their own franchise. Edelman, supra note 169, at 
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to just about 60%. Id. 
 184 Edelman, supra note 169, at 48. Many major sports markets are not represented in one or more 
of the major professional sports leagues: Houston (no NHL team), Seattle (no NHL or NBA team), 
San Diego (no NBA, NHL, or NFL team), Tampa Bay (no NBA team), and Baltimore (no NHL or 
NBA team). Id. 
 185 Greenberg & Hughes, supra note 32, at 92. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Thomas V. Chema, When Professional Sports Justify the Subsidy, a Reply to Robert A. Baade, 
18 J. URB. AFF. 19, 20 (1996) (responding to Robert Baade’s empirical research regarding the eco-
nomic justifications for professional sports stadiums). 
 189 Gesualdi, supra note 174, at 287. Scholars dispute the economic benefits of stadiums as con-
struction projects. See, e.g., Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 183, at 108–09. The problem, they sug-
gest, is that every dollar spent on sports stadium construction brings with it opportunity cost that could 
be spent on other necessary municipal services. Id. 
 190 Goodman, supra note 5, at 201. 
 191 See Irwin Kishner & David Hoffman, Field of Dreams: The Benefits of Public and Private 
Cooperation in Financing Professional Sports Stadiums, 28 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 20, 21 (2010) (cit-
ing Baltimore’s Inner Harbor and Cleveland’s Gateway district as examples). 
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But beyond even the construction-related employment, professional fran-
chises employ hosts of marketing staff, game-day employees, coaches, scouts, 
reporters, and lawyers.192 Additionally, bringing in opposing fans and visiting 
reporters and staff and using the stadium as concert venues or event sites out-
side of the professional team’s season results in further commerce.193 
Beyond the economic benefits that advocates point to, there are political 
realities that support the construction of stadiums as well.194 Sports fans make 
up an influential political voting bloc whose voting desires are easily measura-
ble: does the city support the local franchises?195 Popular support for sports 
franchises stems from the intangible benefits that sports franchises are said to 
provide.196 Though they are not readily quantifiable, city pride, collective iden-
tity, national recognition, and public participation in sports are beneficial as-
pects of urban life.197 When a family turns on their television to watch their 
local team, they receive some of the benefits of supporting their local fran-
chise.198 
Unlike other forms of entertainment, professional sports have a wider ge-
ographic appeal, pulling in cross-country visitors and generating a positive 
publicity for potential economic migrants.199 Companies may also be encour-
aged to open offices in a city that has been “validated” by the existence of a 
sports franchise.200 Furthermore, professional franchises provide entertainment 
opportunities for corporations seeking to lure clients as corporations are the 
biggest consumer of luxury suites—in part a reflection of their utility as mar-
keting devices.201 There are additional benefits to property owners, local busi-
nesses, and community members whose property value rises as a consequence 
of the proximity to a stadium.202 
                                                                                                                           
 192 Id.; Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 183, at 104. Sports teams employ, on average, some-
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 199 Siegfried & Zimbalist, supra note 183, at 99–100. 
 200 Chema, supra note 188, at 21; Gesualdi, supra note 174, at 287. 
 201 Robinson, supra note 8, at 145. 
 202 Chema, supra note 188, at 21. 
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The rosy outlook on the construction of professional stadiums and their 
accompanying franchises, however, does seem to tarnish a bit under scruti-
ny.203 The purported economic benefits that are said to come with a new stadi-
um are embellished.204 The direct benefits—spending, construction, and jobs—
may not be the most efficient taxpayer investment, or, as some scholars would 
suggest, may not be noticeably different from forgoing the investment entire-
ly.205 A few scholars even suggest that cities with major sports franchises actu-
ally have a comparatively lower economic growth rate than those without, thus 
slowing any potential increases to per capita income.206 For example, the dol-
lars spent on entertainment at MetLife Stadium in New Jersey, or Citi Field in 
New York, are dollars that could otherwise be spent on Broadway.207 Further-
more, most jobs generated by these venues are low-skilled, low-wage jobs with 
little long-term staying power.208   
The intangible benefits provided by professional sports franchises are dif-
ficult to quantify and impossible to accurately weigh.209 The positive externali-
ties intrinsic in hosting a professional franchise stem from their validating ef-
fect on fans and citizens and the “enhanced” municipal image bestowed by the 
franchise.210 Even so, large portions of the public fail to perceive the existence 
of these intangible benefits.211 
Furthermore, the true cost of the stadium subsidy is not proportionately 
borne by those who benefit from it.212 In particular, where stadium construc-
tion projects double as methods of urban re-development and re-vitalization, 
the residents who stand with the most to lose are the existing, typically low 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See, e.g., Richard C. Auxier, Everyone Should Cheer the End of Tax-Exempt Bonds for Sports 
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income, residents.213 Couple this with the fact that sales taxes, sin taxes, and a 
number of the other forms of taxation commonly used to secure the develop-
ment bonds, are regressive taxes that fall most heavily on poorer residents.214 
Furthermore, because of rising ticket prices, especially when new stadiums 
open, lower income residents are doubly penalized because they bear a dispro-
portionately large share of the tax while they receive a disproportionately small 
share of the benefits.215 
Additionally, the tax dollars used to subsidize the construction of a pro-
fessional stadium bear an opportunity cost as they could otherwise be invested 
in the arts, in local infrastructure, or school-building.216 Although it is not a 
foregone conclusion that these uses are preferable, it bears noting that the 
money is typically a net drain on the city’s coffers.217 
III. GETTING CITIES BACK IN THE GAME 
As public opposition has grown toward publicly subsidized stadium con-
struction projects, several proposals have emerged to affect lasting changes—
though none have gained sufficient momentum until recently.218 Courts have 
consistently held that subsidizing stadiums constitutes a public purpose and 
refused to sustain challenges to their public financing.219 Although Congress 
has, at various times, considered reform of the tax-exempt bond rules relating 
to the construction of stadiums, none of the proposed legislation has made it to 
a vote.220 
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Other proposals to reform stadium financing—such as breaking up the 
major sports leagues to encourage inter-league competition or providing for 
relegation and promotion from lower-level leagues—suffer from their over-
breadth or infeasibility.221 Even more recent attempts, like former President 
Barack Obama’s budget proposal to eliminate the payment and security test for 
bonds financing professional sports facilities failed to muster the necessary 
support to effectuate change.222 Further, the House of Representatives pro-
posed a more recent change that would have removed the tax-exempt status of 
bonds used for stadiums, but the reconciled bill did not include this provi-
sion.223 This Part argues that though the previous attempts at reform failed, 
some compromise can be found.224 
Section A of this Part evaluates the previous attempts to reform the tax-
exempt bond scheme and discusses potential solutions moving forward.225 Sec-
tion B evaluates potential regulatory solutions to the challenges of franchise re-
location, expansion, and the accompanying stadium construction.226 Section C 
argues that reform to the IRC is necessary, but that the fundamental approach 
should be permissive rather than paternal, allowing municipalities flexibility, 
while not singling out sports in comparison to other commercial enterprises.227 
A. Reform to Tax-Exempt Bonds 
Even if the 1986 Tax Reform Act was well-intentioned, it failed to ac-
complish its intended purpose and instead passed off an even heavier cost to 
state and local governments beholden to professional franchises.228 Rather than 
reducing the power of sports franchises over communities, the 1986 Tax Re-
form Act increased competition between cities and restricted their available 
incentives to attract or retain franchises.229 
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Two legislative fixes were proposed in the late 1990s.230 The first, the 
Team Relocation and Taxpayer Protection Act, aimed to combat public subsi-
dies by preventing teams from threatening to leave communities.231 The bill 
would have prohibited teams who broke lease agreements from receiving the 
benefits of tax-exempt bonds in future stadium financing.232 Critics of the bill, 
however, were quick to point out that the bill unfairly discriminated against 
professional sports teams while leaving out other corporations that frequently 
change communities in pursuit of the most favorable tax incentives.233 Fur-
thermore, overly stringent restrictions on franchise movement run the risk of 
being anti-competitive, thus preventing markets from being served efficiently.234 
The second proposal, the Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act 
(“STADIA”) attempted to protect taxpayers by ending the tax subsidy for 
sports stadium bonds entirely.235 The bill aimed to reclassify stadium bonds as 
private activity bonds, thereby preventing them from realizing the tax-exempt 
benefits.236 The complete bar proved fatal to the legislation, however, as state 
and local political units, members of the bond industry, and franchises opposed 
the federal intervention preventing them from pursuing their ostensibly public 
purpose.237 
B. Increased Regulation of Sports Leagues 
With the incredible bargaining power of professional sports leagues, some 
scholars would suggest that the only means of reigning in their power would 
be through increased regulation of their operations.238 Congress undoubtedly 
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has the regulatory authority under the commerce clause power.239 Because of 
the extensive entry barriers present in the industry, such as high labor costs, 
venue costs, and media contracts, the formation of competing, commercially 
successful leagues seems unlikely without government intervention.240 Moreo-
ver, renewed regulation of the major sports leagues would not be particularly 
novel, as Congress proposed to create a Federal Sports Commission to do just 
that in 1972.241 
Of the most common proposals to restrict the teams’ bargaining power, 
restricting franchise free agency—their ability to relocate at will—appears to 
be the most feasible and effective option.242 The fact that the demand for a pro-
fessional franchise is far greater than the current supply creates a franchise’s 
superior bargaining position.243 By restricting the ability of franchises to relo-
cate at will, it would be possible to return some power to state and municipal 
governments.244 Restricting relocation alone, however, would likely be ineffi-
cient and, at the very least, would leave many markets under-served.245 The 
demands for franchises change with time, and if there were additional burdens 
on franchise relocation, teams may not be able to relocate to developing urban 
centers.246 
An alternative to simply limiting relocation would be to enable a regula-
tory agency to direct the leagues to expand into new markets as the demand for 
new teams becomes economically viable.247 Two main factors weigh in favor 
of this strategy: first, a regulatory agency, familiar with the leagues business 
model and attuned to the public’s demands, would be able to navigate the 
complexities of forced expansion; and second, a regulator would be able to 
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control the leagues development, thereby restricting their ability to extract 
egregious terms from localities.248 
Some critics of the professional sports leagues’ monopoly power have 
called for divestiture to replace the major sports leagues with multiple smaller, 
more competitive leagues.249 In theory, multiple leagues would increase com-
petition that would lead to an expansion into different markets and greater bar-
gaining power for municipalities that were interested in hosing professional 
franchises.250 But divestiture proposals are infeasibility and are subject to pub-
lic opposition, not to mention the impossible complexity of re-allocating teams 
from the existing leagues.251 Further, the competitive success of multiple, over-
lapping sports leagues would be far from certain, as history has demonstrated a 
natural tendency toward sports league monopolies.252 
C. Remaining Options 
The enormous bargaining power that sports leagues wield against state 
and municipal governments demonstrates the necessity of reform to federal tax 
policy permitting the tax-exempt funding of stadiums or further regulation of 
sports leagues.253 Though most proposals suffer from their over-breadth or 
their infeasibility, market trends in sports financing have demonstrated that 
public finance is not necessary to achieve a successful and profitable fran-
chise. 254 Furthermore, it is not out of the question that the public purpose doc-
trine could be reformed.255 In stadium financings, the private beneficiaries in-
clude franchise owners, professional players, and the employees—construction 
workers, architects, and media—who service the stadium.256 Local corpora-
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tions also benefit, as they are afforded new means of wooing customers and 
rewarding employees.257 Although some would argue that these consumers will 
be able to receive a public benefit by purchasing tickets, the benefit is not al-
ways attainable by the interested public.258 
The challenge is that stadiums are designed such that only a limited 
amount of the public who wish to purchase a ticket may do so.259 Consequent-
ly, the individual benefit pales in comparison to the direct financial benefit to 
the players and franchise owners whose bottom lines are increased.260 This 
leaves two distinct options available for reform: a change in tax policy that 
would promote public-private partnerships with respect to sports franchises by 
focusing on sports complexes as broader development projects, or a the crea-
tion of a regulatory agency focused on controlling league expansion and relo-
cation.261 The latter would require increased federal intrusion into a province 
of primarily state and local governance.262 This it is not without precedent, 
however.263 As noted, Congress has previously considered such an agency.264 
With the next round of stadium construction just around the corner, perhaps as 
early as 2020, the time to take action is now.265 
The second option would come by way of tax reform that would restrict 
the ability of stadium construction projects to qualify for tax-exempt bonds, 
either through a stronger, more aggressive public purpose doctrine, or a re-
definition of the appropriate terms for tax-exempt bonds.266 In theory, munici-
palities ought not to directly fund stadiums and arenas because they constitute 
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unconstitutional financial assistance to a private enterprise.267 Although courts 
have traditionally been reluctant to step in and impose on the decisions of mu-
nicipal governments, the egregious nature of financing stadiums—especially 
when such a small economic benefit actually flows to taxpayers—suggests that 
such deference should not be given.268 What seems certain, however, is that the 
1986 tax-exempt bond restrictions go too far in restricting the means of munic-
ipalities to secure their bonds, resulting counterintuitively in increased financ-
ing costs and reduced bargaining power for municipalities.269 
Consequently, the optimal approach would be to restrict the amount of fi-
nancing that could come from the municipality by requiring the franchise to 
find private financing equal or greater to the public contribution.270 This could 
be done by enabling the IRS or another federal agency to review the terms of 
the stadium financing agreements to determine the eligibility for tax-exempt 
status.271 The revision to the IRC previously proposed by Congress takes one 
major step in this direction by eliminating the ability for municipalities to qual-
ify for the tax-exempt municipal bonds when the funds are directed toward 
stadium construction.272 Although this may address Franchise Free Agency, 
however, it singles out stadium construction while other business entities 
commonly receive this preferential treatment from cities and municipalities.273 
In combination with a loosening of the restrictions imposed by the 1986 
Act, requiring additional qualifications to qualify for tax-exempt status would 
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result in an improved municipal bargaining position and make public finance 
less attractive to sports franchises.274 This approach has two primary ad-
vantages: first, it would require team owners and the leagues to buy-in; and sec-
ond, it would encourage additional investment in development, thereby allowing 
the benefits of public finance to flow back toward those who contributed.275 
CONCLUSION 
Building a state-of-the-art stadium is a difficult, yet profitable, endeavor. 
The current landscape of stadium financing deprives municipalities of effective 
means of bargaining with anti-competitive sports leagues who wield the lim-
ited number of their teams as bargaining chips to extort franchise and league 
friendly construction contracts. Compounding that, the dispersed costs and 
direct benefits make public opposition to stadium construction difficult. Pro-
gress can be made in preventing overtly franchise-friendly deals, however, by 
requiring league and franchise financial contributions and by using tax mecha-
nisms to reallocate the tax burden more heavily upon those who stand to gain 
the most. Although regulatory schemes suffer from their over-breadth and po-
litical infeasibility, a cohesive approach to reform the restraints on the issuance 
of tax-exempt bonds in combination with a re-conceptualization of how mu-
nicipalities view stadium construction could yield a more taxpayer friendly 
environment as we enter a new era of stadium construction. 
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